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The Formation of International Treaties
VINCY FON,1 FRANCESCO PARISI 2
George Washington University; University of Minnesota and University of Bologna

This paper develops a stylized model of international treaty formation and analyzes the different modalities
with which states can become part of an international treaty according to the procedures set forth by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. We consider the rules governing accession to international
treaties, distinguishing between three situations: (i) Treaties for which acceptance of a new member requires
unanimous approval of the signatory states with an amendment of the original treaty agreement (closed
treaties); (ii) Treaties where acceptance of a new member is made possible through approval by a majority of
the existing member states (semi-open treaties); and (iii) Treaties where the original member states have agreed
to leave the treaty open for accession by other states (open treaties).

International treaties are instruments of international cooperation. While states can
pursue some goals in isolation, international cooperation may provide an
opportunity to more effectively achieve such goals. States can become part of an
international treaty in two ways: (i) being among the original signatory states of a
treaty; and (ii) acceding to an existing treaty. Original signatory states often face
substantial costs in the process of treaty negotiation and drafting, while the costs of
acceding to an existing treaty are generally lower. However, there are benefits in
being part of the original group of signatory states, rather than acceding to the
treaty at a later stage. For example, the founding states influence the content of the
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treaty. In this paper we analyze the process of treaty formation in light of the
possibility that non-signatory states may be given an opportunity to join an existing
treaty through accession. Under what conditions is it desirable for the original
states to leave a treaty open for accession? What are the likely characteristics of
these treaties?
This paper provides a model of international treaty formation to analyze the
different modalities with which states can become party to an international treaty.
We analyze the advantage which original signatory states have over acceding states
that justifies undertaking the initial treaty negotiation costs. Section 1 starts by
describing the main categories of treaty accession: (i) closed treaties; (ii) semi-open
treaties; and (iii) open treaties. Section 2 considers the process of treaty formation
under these possibilities. Section 3 discusses some variations of the basic model
and draws conclusions.

1. FORMATION AND ACCESSION TO INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES
The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties allows the original parties to an
international treaty to determine if and how non-signatory states may subsequently
join the treaty agreement. Article 15 of the Vienna Convention authorizes a state to
consent to be bound to a treaty by accession when:
a. the treaty provides that such consent may be expressed by that State by
means of accession;
b. it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that
such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession; or
c. all the parties have subsequently agreed that such consent may be
expressed by that State by means of accession.3
International law thus requires prior or subsequent consent of the signatory states
for an applicant state’s accession to an existing treaty. When signatory states preauthorize accession of applicant states at the time of signing the original treaty, the
treaty is described as “open” for accession. Conversely, if no such preauthorization is given in the original treaty, subsequent consent by all signatory
states is necessary for an applicant’s accession and the treaty is “closed.” The
intermediate case of “semi-open” treaties leaves admission of a new applicant in
the hands of a majority of the signatory states.
3 Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 15, available at:
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treatfra.htm.
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The default rule dictates that a treaty is closed unless its terms provide for open or
semi-open accession (Bishop, 1971:119). In the matter of accepting new members to a
treaty, a state must consent to the specific approval of all current member states, or
expressly waive such consent by an open (or semi-open) accession clause. This
insures that the existing parties approve changes in membership, so their rights and
obligations are not disturbed without their consent (Starke, 1989:458-9). The
International Law Commission (ILC) has advocated changing the default rule to
make all multilateral treaties open for accession unless otherwise stated. A similar
change was advocated for plurilateral treaties, when a state invited to participate in
negotiations to become a founding state declined to join the treaty at that time. The
treaty would be left open for such states that subsequently applied for accession.
Signatory states that disapproved of the accession could hold the treaty inoperative
between themselves and the acceding state.
The ILC modifications were expressed through draft articles on the laws of treaty
that have not been adopted.4 The analysis in Section 2 shows that the prevailing
default rule favoring closed-form treaties may be justified. States face incentive
problems when confronted with treaty participation. Since treaty negotiation is
costly, leaving all multilateral treaties open for accession by default could
undermine incentives to invest in the initial negotiation and drafting of treaty
agreements.

1.1. CLOSED TREATIES
According to Article 15(c), some treaties are closed treaties in which acceptance of
a new member requires unanimous approval by the current signatory states. Most
bilateral treaties are closed since they concern a relationship between two entities.
Although closed treaties do not allow automatic accession, with unanimous
consent the existing signatory states can amend the original treaty to allow
accession of a non-signatory state. For example, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations Treaty (ASEAN) was amended several times to allow the accession
of Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. However, it was
not amended to permit the accession of Papua New Guinea (Chinkin, 1993:53).5
A closed treaty may serve a function that requires exclusivity. For example, the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in 1968, extended
special privileges to states that manufactured and detonated nuclear weapons prior

4 Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, Arts. 8-9, 1962 Vol II. U.N.Y.B of the Int’l L.
Comm’n 167-68, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/144. For further analysis of the ILC proposal, see Kelsen
(1966:479-80).
5 See Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) website at: http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm.
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to 1967, designating these as “nuclear weapons states.”6 In an effort to limit the
number of states that hold special privileges with regard to nuclear weapons,
similar privileges were not subsequently extended to other states that manufactured
nuclear explosive devices after the effective date of the treaty (Beemelmans, 1997:85).
Some closed treaties are open or semi-open to specific groups of countries, but
closed to the world-at-large. For instance, the General Act of Arbitration of 1928
contained a clause which stated, “[t]he present General Act shall be open to
accession by all the Heads of States or other competent authorities of the Members
of the League of Nations and the non-Member States to which the Council of the
League of Nations has communicated a copy for this purpose.”7 This Act was
initially open to most non-signatory states, who were members of the original
League. However, the treaty became more closed over time as more states came
into existence after the treaty was formed. Some interesting questions were raised
concerning Pakistan and India, which both gained independence from British India
in 1947. Pakistan claimed authority under the treaty in a legal dispute against India
before the International Court of Justice in 2000.8 India claimed that it was not
bound to the treaty because it never specifically provided its consent to be bound
and in fact manifested its explicit intent not to be bound in 1974.9 Further, India
argued that Pakistan could not invoke the treaty because it was not the
“continuator of British India” and therefore could not accede to the treaty due to
its closed nature. 10 The Court found India’s prior manifestation of not-to-bebound intent sufficient, and denied application of the General Act.11

1.2. SEMI-OPEN TREATIES
Semi-open treaties are treaties where acceptance of a new member depends on
approval by a majority of the existing signatory states. These treaties invite
accession, but require a majority of the signatory states to approve specific acts of
accession. Although semi-open treaties generally specify the conditions for
accession in the terms of the treaty, the need for specification is less critical than
6 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art. IX(3), 21 U.S.T. 483,
492-93, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 174.
7 General Act of Arbitration for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Geneva, 26
September 1928).
8 Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), 2000 ICJ 12 (2000).
9 Id. at 19.
10 Pakistan argued that the Schedule to Indian Independence transferred unto India and
Pakistan all international rights and obligation upon India and Pakistan, excluding those
regarding territorial issues and international organizations. Id. at 19-20.
11 Id. at 25. The Court rejected each of the jurisdictional claims put forth by Pakistan and
found that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter.
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under the case of open treaties, given that the majority of signatory states must
review and accept accession terms.
A traditional example of a semi-open treaty is the 1974 Agreement on an
International Energy Program, which promotes the secure acquisition of oil. The
treaty sets up a Governing Board which includes representatives of the
participating states, but with a balance of power among the original signatories.
The accession clause of this agreement states that a country seeking to enter by
accession must gain approval of a majority of the Governing Board.12
One variant of a semi-open treaty is the 1993 Center for International Forestry
Research Treaty, which “established a Center for International Forestry Research
(CIFOR) which will be concerned with forestry research that benefits developing
countries.”13 The treaty was left open for “original” signatories for two years, after
which states seeking accession must receive approval from a majority of members
of the CIFOR Board of Trustees.
Another variant of the semi-open treaty comes from the Treaty of Rome
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC 1951). Although the only
formal criterion for membership in the Community was a state’s “European
identity,” member states have used various unwritten requirements to weigh the
eligibility of new entrants. This leaves great political discretion to current member
states on whether to allow accession to new applicants. Although treaty
amendments require the consent of every incumbent state, accession negotiations
take place between candidate members and the Commission, which is a
representative organ deliberating on a majority basis.14
Although our analysis in Section 2 concentrates on semi-open treaties where
accession of new states is contingent on approval by a simple majority of states,
some semi-open treaties require more than a simple majority. One such treaty is
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (GATT
12 Agreement on an International Energy Program, TIAS 8278, 27 U.S.T. 1685; 1974 U.S.T.
LEXIS 278 at *45.
13 Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), TIAS 11960, 1993 U.S.T. LEXIS 16 at *1
(March 5, 1993).
14 The EEC example is a hybrid case – with some features of a semi-open treaty and other
features of a closed treaty. Although the organs of the community approve accession with a
majority vote, an intergovernmental conference is necessary (with proper state ratification) in
order for a new accession to become effective. At this stage, incumbent member states have the
power to impose conditions for accession of new states. These conditions are often imposed
with reference to: (a) the modes for extending membership and the composition or
representation within EC institutions; and (b) the acceptance of all past regulations and
implementation of all past directives within a given period (generally rather long). Some
bargaining takes place and modifications are made at this stage.
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1994), which established the World Trade Organization (WTO). Its accession
clause provides that states seeking accession to the treaty (and membership into the
WTO), must gain the approval of two-thirds of the present WTO membership.15
The clause also states that the Ministerial Conference may negotiate terms of
agreement with the state seeking accession, creating an opportunity for negotiation
for those states that may initially lack two-thirds support (Karasik, 1997:529).
The majoritarian principle that is at work in the admission of new states
highlights the difference between consent to be bound in the formation of a closed
treaty and consent in the case of semi-open treaties. Part II, Section I of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties refers to the process by which parties officially
manifest their consent to be bound to one another by the specified terms of the
treaty. However, as pointed out by Kelsen (1966:480-1), in the case of semi-open
accession, an original signatory agrees to be bound to a treaty knowing that treaty
participation and content can subsequently be modified by a majority of signatory
states. A minority signatory state may later disagree with changes brought about by
the accession of a new state, but is nevertheless bound to the treaty as modified by
the majority.

1.3. OPEN TREATIES
Open treaties contain clauses under which the original member states grant a right
to accede to all states that are willing to agree to the terms of a treaty, though
sometimes subjecting the right of accession to some general limitations. Open
accession clauses are common in multilateral treaties, particularly those of general
concern that promote cooperation and foster dispute resolution between states.16
For instance, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) states in
Article 50 that the Convention “shall remain open for accession” to all states,
United Nations members, parties to the statute of the International Court of
Justice, and other states invited by the UN General Assembly to join the
Convention.
Many treaties have no original signatories in the technical sense, but rather require
all states who wish to join the treaty do so through accession (Perry et al., 1996:3). The
15 Besides offering an interesting example of semi-open accession, GATT 1994 demonstrates
another interesting aspect to accession rules in general. While accession to a treaty puts the acceding
state on equal terms with original members, there is nothing to prevent future amendments from
discriminating against such states. According to GATT 1994, only the original members of GATT
1947 became original members of the WTO. All parties that subsequently joined GATT 1947 by
accession were now excluded from GATT 1994 and the WTO, pending accession.
16 See Bishop (1971:119) and Kelsen (1966:478-79). Hedlund (1994:295) observes that one
feature of a treaty designed to enhance competition in the global airline market would be an
open accession clause.
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treaty may take effect once a specific number of states ratify it (Starke, 1989:458).
Being party to the original group of signatory states only provides the advantage of
being able to influence the treaty content. Some treaties remain open for original
signatures for a set time period, after which states must enter through accession.
Open treaties do not require affirmative action by the original signatories. They
are more rigid in their content formulation, since all conditions for treaty accession
must be specified ex ante. For example, the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, December 18,
1997, (also known as the OECD Convention), is open to “non-members which
become full participants in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International
Business Transactions.” 17 By formulating the conditions and prerequisites for
accession, the original signatory states avoid the necessity for a formal
renegotiation of the treaty, thus permitting expansion without a simultaneous
alteration of treaty content. Although amendments of treaty content are possible
through unanimous consent in an open treaty, original states can de facto achieve a
greater protection of their own interests and the integrity of the treaty, while at the
same time securing the freedom of entry that open-accession clauses provide.

2. FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
In deciding treaty participation, rational states compare the net payoff without
international cooperation with that obtainable through international cooperation in
pursuit of a given goal. We think of the payoff obtainable by states in the absence
of international cooperation as the “self-help” payoff. The highest self-help payoff
represents the opportunity cost that states face when contemplating participation
in an international treaty. States may be more or less equipped to pursue specific
goals in the absence of international cooperation, and may derive different net
benefits from such pursuits. That is, states face different opportunity costs in treaty
participation. The payoff for state i, obtainable without treaty participation, is
1
Vi1 ( s ) when undertaking an effort level s, where Vi is assumed to be strictly
concave. The superscript signifies that the state is not cooperating with other states
(only 1 state is involved, the state itself). The maximum payoff obtainable for each
state without participating in a treaty is Vˆi1 , the state’s opportunity cost in treaty
participation.
17 Argentina-Brazil-Bulgaria-Chile-Slovak Republic Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development: Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, December 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, 6 (1998).
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By engaging in international cooperation, states may exceed their opportunity
costs. This may be due to economies of scale in the pursuit of the common goal,
the presence of gains from trade, or benefits from coordination and network
effects. International treaties may serve to secure these benefits. In an N-state
treaty, ( s NT , N ) represents the benefit enjoyed by each state participating in the
treaty. The benefit from treaty participation is an increasing function of s NT ,
the effort level mandated by the treaty (hereinafter referred to as treaty content),
and N, the number of participants in the treaty. The treaty variable s has two
subscripts: the variable subscript N refers to the number of treaty participants and
the fixed T signifies that it is the treaty content. 18 A treaty agreement with no
substantive content generates no benefit: (0, N ) = 0 . Similarly, no benefit can be
derived from a treaty without other states: ( s1T ,1) = 0 . Further, states obtain nonincreasing marginal benefits from more substantive treaty content: S S 0 .
We consider both complementarity and substitution between treaty content and
participation. Complementarity may characterize international agreements for
adopting new technological standards with network externalities, or situations
distinguished by weakest-link problems, such as the fight against terrorism. In these
cases, the treaty effort level and the number of participants are complements:
. In other situations such as environmental cleanup or financial
SN > 0
contributions to fight hunger in third world countries, one state’s increase in effort
can make up for another state’s reduction. The treaty effort level and the number
of participants are then substitutes: S N < 0 .
The total payoff for state i, when participating in an N-state treaty with content
s NT , is Vi N ( s NT ) = Vi1 ( s NT ) + ( s NT , N ) ci . Here Vi1 represents the state’s direct
net benefit from undertaking the effort specified by the treaty: if state i undertakes
effort level s NT by itself without joining a treaty, then its benefit is Vi1 ( s NT ) . Once
the state joins the treaty, is the additional benefit from undertaking the effort in
the company of other participating states, and ci represents the costs of
negotiating and drafting the treaty, as well as the political cost of joining the treaty.
The superscript for V refers to the number of treaty participants, where 1
indicates the payoff without participating in a treaty. A superscript greater than 1
represents the state’s total net payoff, including gains from cooperation and
negotiation costs. We simplify notation by assuming that the negotiation cost for a
18 The variable N appears twice in the benefit function, B. It has both a direct effect on the
benefit from participating in a treaty (i.e., widespread membership may affect benefits) and an
indirect effect through the treaty content (i.e., changes in membership may affect treaty content).
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state is constant and independent of the number of states involved in negotiating a
treaty. To ease the notational burden further, the negotiation cost is the same
whether the state negotiates to form a treaty with other states or requests accession
to an existing treaty, although we expect that the former exceeds the latter. It is
possible that both the payoff Vi1 and the benefit from treaty participation are
present discount values of future benefits. The negotiation cost of a treaty is borne
only once. Any costs suffered in future periods, for example minor political
consequences, can be subsumed as part of the payoff Vi1 .

2.1. SETTING THE STAGE: INITIAL TREATY FORMATION
States can join an international treaty as original signatory states or by acceding to
an existing treaty. Accession to a treaty presupposes the existence of a treaty
formed by a group of founding states. To set the stage for analyzing treaty
accession, first consider the process of treaty formation by a group of states.
Founding states become the incumbent states that control entry of new states
applying for accession according to rules set forth in the initial treaty agreement.
Without loss of generality, consider the simplifying case of two states forming a
treaty. When two states form a treaty with content s2T , each state’s payoff from
participating in the treaty becomes Vi 2 ( s2T ) = Vi1 ( s2T ) + ( s2T ,2) ci . Negotiation
of the treaty content s2T by a Nash bargaining game is considered. The bargaining
powers for the two risk-neutral states, state 1 and state 2, are
and 1
1
1
ˆ
ˆ
respectively. Recall that V1 and V2 are the opportunity costs of treaty
participation that each state can obtain through its own effort without participating
in a treaty. These are their threat points in the bargaining problem or their best
alternatives to a negotiated agreement. The Nash bargaining solution to the 2-state
treaty negotiation, s2T , is the solution to the problem:
max (V12 Vˆ11 ) (V22 Vˆ21 )1 = (V11 ( s) + (s,2) c1 Vˆ11 ) (V21 ( s) + (s,2) c2 Vˆ21 )1
s

(1)

s.t. V12 Vˆ11 , V22

Vˆ21 .

This Nash bargaining solution can vary with different scenarios. We highlight the
importance of different factors in determining the outcome of the bargaining
solution.
(A) We should stress the importance of the magnitudes of the benefit from treaty
participation and the bargaining and negotiating costs ci . High benefits from
international cooperation and low bargaining costs are required before states will
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1148
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agree to international cooperation. Otherwise, bargaining room for states to
achieve acceptable treaty content may be lacking and no treaty will be signed.
As a simple example, consider the payoff Vi1 ( s ) = bi s ai s 2 and the benefit from
joining the treaty = s , where the dependence of on the number of treaty
participants is suppressed. Then b1 2a1 = arg max V11 and (b1 + ) 2a1 = arg max V12 .
The optimal level b1 2a1 is chosen by state 1 in the absence of a treaty. The level
(b1 + ) 2a1 is the desired treaty content for state 1, without considering the other
state’s constraint or any bargaining issues. The desired treaty content is greater than
the optimal effort without joining the treaty, because higher effort leads to higher
mutual benefit from treaty participation. Also, the opportunity cost for state 1 with
no treaty is Vˆ11 = b12 4a1 . Under a treaty, the best payoff that state 1 can hope for is
~
V12 = [(b1 + ) 2 4a1 ] c1 . State 1 will participate in a treaty only if
[(b1 + ) 2 4a1 ] c1 > b12 4a1 . This means that (2b1 + ) 4a1 > c1 . Thus, the higher
the benefit from international cooperation
and/or the lower the cost of
negotiation c1 , the more likely the inequality holds. It then becomes more likely
that state 1 will participate in a treaty formation. This matches our intuition exactly.
Note that a high potential benefit from cooperation and a low transaction cost to
participate in a treaty only provide the backdrop for a state’s willingness to join a
treaty. Whether a state indeed participates in the formation of a treaty rests on the
negotiation process and treaty content. Thus, in the following, we assume that it is
beneficial for a state to participate in treaty formation, and turn to the outcome of
the Nash bargaining process itself.
(B) Consider the case of homogeneous states with identical preferences and costs of
negotiation and drafting, and the same gains to cooperation
( V12 ( s ) Vˆ11 = V22 ( s) Vˆ21 ). The bargaining power of states does not matter here,
since
their
interests
coincide
exactly.
The
treaty
content,
2
1
1
1
ˆ
ˆ
,
maximizes
net
payoff
for
each
state,
arg max Vi (s ) Vi = (Vi ( s ) + ( s,2) ci Vi )
19
and a treaty is formed. Convergence of the interests of homogenous states leads
to the best outcome possible. In general, when states have similar preferences and
similar negotiation and drafting costs, there is little disagreement concerning treaty
content, and a treaty will thus be formed. This explains why many regional treaties
are formed among rather homogeneous states.
(C) Next consider heterogeneous states with diametrically opposite bargaining strengths. The
states’ preferences Vi differ and one state, say state 1, has overwhelming bargaining
19

Using the same payoff and benefit-from-treaty functions as in case (A), the effort level

(bi + ) 2ai is the treaty content desired by both states.
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strength. In the limiting case where state 1 has all of the bargaining power, the
bargaining solution must satisfy max V12 Vˆ11 s.t. V22 Vˆ21 . Thus, due to its
superior bargaining power, state 1 realizes most, if not all, the gains from
cooperation. The treaty content maximizes state 1’s net payoff, while the less
persuasive state 2 remains close to its threat point. An extreme example involves a
state with little potential gain being strong-armed into signing a treaty.20
(D) Now turn to the case of heterogeneous states with different preferences but very
similar bargaining powers.21 Not surprisingly, the tension created by different payoff
patterns but equal bargaining power to pull and push the treaty content would be
greatest under this circumstance. In particular, when states are even in their
bargaining power, at the optimal treaty content, the net payoff from treaty
participation for one country is increasing while that of another country is
decreasing. This is because the treaty content must satisfy:
(V12 ( s ) Vˆ11 ) V22 s + (V22 ( s ) Vˆ21 ) V12 s = 0 . Since the coefficients in the
equation represent the gains to each state from joining the treaty and are positive,
the two partials in the equation must be opposite in sign. That is, when the treaty
content is increased, the state with the positive partial will gain while the other state
loses. We submit that many treaties signed by “equal-partner” countries, for
example, the 1951 treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the
1956 treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and the 1957
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community, fit the
description of this case.
The analysis of these different cases clarifies the resulting formation of treaties
with different countries. The first important criterion for the formation of an
international treaty is a substantial gain in cooperation and reasonable bargaining
cost for each participating state. Beyond that, we observe that homogeneous states
are most likely to form an international treaty to cooperate. In such cases we
surmise that the treaty would likely be open or semi-open. Any state willing to join
the open treaty, accepting treaty content as is, would be welcomed by the signatory
states. Likewise, acceptance by a majority of signatory states of the accession of a
new state to a semi-open treaty means that the interests of all other states with
similar preferences are well served.
Treaties signed by one country to cede a city or a port to another country may fit this
scenario. In the Treaty of Nanking (1842) which ended the first opium war, China opened
additional ports of trade, eliminated trade barriers, ceded the offshore island of Hong Kong to
Britain, and allowed Britain’s drug trade to continue despite the Chinese ban. Signing the treaty
helped the Chinese to avoid further war with the British.
21 This is the basic Nash bargaining problem that Nash (1950) discussed. In our notation, this
is the case when 2 = 1/2.
20
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In the case of heterogeneous states with an overwhelming bargaining strength for
one party, the strong-armed state enjoys most of the benefit of cooperation. The
weaker state gains little. We surmise that the treaty would most likely be closed,
since the stronger state may refuse to give away any stake resulting from the
negotiation advantage that it enjoys. In the more general case, a very strong state
may sustain a closed treaty with a few weaker states. For example, the old Soviet
Union may have forced other countries to join their version of NATO. On the
other hand, if a group of weak states is capable of extracting concessions from a
strong state while negotiating a treaty, then the strong state would have preferred
to sign many separate treaties with individual weaker states.22
When states are heterogeneous but have fairly even bargaining powers, in order
for a treaty to be formed, the range of effort level with potential gain from
cooperation must be large for all participating states. Otherwise, there is
insufficient bargaining room for the states to negotiate. If one state desires high
treaty content while another wants low content, the resulting treaty content is
typically a compromise. With any change in treaty content, stakes change for some
parties. Thus, there is little reason for founding states to be amenable to new treaty
content. However, if additional treaty membership with no alteration of treaty
content creates large additional gains for every state, then an open treaty may be in
order. This is especially true if the founding states anticipate a pool of future
accession applicants who are amenable to existing treaty terms.
Not only does the expected number of potential entrants matter, but the typology
of states expected to request accession may also matter. Founding states may
prefer not to accept an accession application from one state while accepting an
application from another state. For example, the founding states accept accession
applications from states willing to increase the content of the treaty undertaking,
but not from others. These factors can also help determine whether the treaty is
closed or left open for accession.
Thus far, we have concentrated on treaty formation and on the interests of the
founding states. Once the treaty is formed, the interests of a potential newcomer
state and interactions between the newcomer and the signatory states become
important. In our notation, after a treaty is formed, the payoffs of the two states
are denoted Vˆ12 and Vˆ22 . With this as a starting point, we now turn to the
accession process.

22

See the related issues on Bilateral Investment Treaties discussed in Section 3.
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2.2. TREATY ACCESSION
Once a treaty is formed, non-signatory states may wish to join the treaty. The
accession process through which other states may join an existing treaty is
generally set out in the original treaty agreement. The three accession types are
discussed separately.

2.2.1. “Closed” Treaties: Unanimous Consent
Suppose a new state applies to join an existing treaty where expansion of the treaty
requires unanimous consent of the signatory states and an amendment to the
treaty. Consider the region where increased treaty participation generates increasing
benefits for all states ( N > 0 ). In the limiting case where the new state has
preferences identical to those of the incumbent signatory states, incumbents
welcome accession, as more states joining the treaty increases the benefit from
treaty participation without modifying treaty content. The more problematic
case emerges when a third state desiring different treaty content applies to join
the treaty.
In a closed treaty where unanimous agreement of the incumbent states is
required, either state would veto the proposed entry if expansion necessitates a
treaty amendment that lowers its payoff compared to the original treaty agreement.
Thus, incumbent states approach an application for new entry by first calculating
whether an additional participant in the treaty is beneficial, assuming that the
entrant accepts the treaty content (possibly amended from the previous content)
proposed by them:

(2)

max (V13 Vˆ12 ) (V23 Vˆ22 )1
s

s.t. V13 Vˆ12 , V23 Vˆ22 .

Setting aside the interest of the newcomer, state 3, for the moment, this treaty
amendment problem is similar to the bargaining problem that states 1 and 2 faced
when negotiating the original treaty agreement. One difference is that the
opportunity costs faced by the original signatory states have changed since they
joined the original treaty. When considering the application for entry by a third
state, the incumbent states look at the higher payoffs generated by the original
treaty ( Vˆ12 and Vˆ22 ) as their opportunity costs, rather than the lower optimal selfhelp payoffs ( Vˆ11 and Vˆ21 ). While admitting a third state creates additional valueenhancing opportunities for both states, new negotiations may entail new costs
similar to those at the formation stage of the original treaty. If treaty expansion
offers no Pareto superior treaty content for the incumbent states, then the current
treaty arrangement is preferable and entry by the third state is denied.
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On the other hand, high increases in benefits from more states participating in
the treaty and low renegotiation costs could produce a range of Pareto superior
treaty arrangements involving admission of the third state. Let s3T be a solution to
the Nash bargaining problem (2) in the enlarged treaty environment. More treaty
participants increases the net payoff from joining the treaty and the range of
agreeable treaty obligations widens for an individual incumbent state. Figure 1
illustrates this for state 1. The existing treaty content between states 1 and 2 is
given by s2T , making Vˆ12 state 1’s payoff derived from the original 2-state treaty.
With a third state joining the treaty, the general net payoff function for state 1
shifts up from V12 to V13 .23 The range of treaty content that makes state 1 at least
as well off as in the original treaty spans s3LT to s3UT . Any proposed treaty
amendment that lies in this region would be agreeable to the incumbent signatory
state. The solution to the incumbents’ bargaining problem generates the proposed
treaty terms for the third state applying for admission.

23 Figure 1 makes an implicit assumption that the cost of negotiation for an additional entrant
equals the original negotiation cost to create the treaty. If the negotiation cost for the incumbent
state is lower in the case of accession by a third state than in the case of forming the treaty, for
example, then the vertical intercept of V13 should be higher than the vertical intercept of V12 .
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Treaty amendments made in contemplation of membership expansion may
increase or reduce substantive treaty obligations. Whether the existing states
propose a treaty amendment s3T containing higher or lower treaty obligations
than the original treaty content, s2T , depends on whether the number of treaty
participants and the treaty content are complements or substitutes. In general,
setting aside any bargaining problems and constraints imposed by other states
wishing to join a treaty, consider the first-best payoff maximization problem for an
existing state in an N-state treaty: say max V1N for state 1. The first-best treaty
s

content desired by the state, sT* , must meet the condition that net marginal payoff
is zero. Simple comparative static results show that dsT* dN > 0 if the treaty
content and the number of treaty participants are complements, and dsT* dN < 0 if
they are substitutes.24 If treaty content and the number of treaty participants are
complements, an increase in the number of states joining the treaty raises the
marginal impact of efforts on payoff. Individual states would prefer a higher treaty
obligation (more effort level) when more states join the treaty. Thus, when treaty
content and the number of treaty participants are complements, treaty content
proposed by the incumbents falls in the region identified by a brace in Figure 1.
(The opposite would hold for substitutes.)
Assume complements so that each participating state is willing to undertake
higher treaty obligations when more states join the treaty. When confronted with
the prospect of treaty expansion brought about by a third state’s application for
entry, both states wish to raise the level of treaty obligation and to amend the treaty
to allow for admission. In this case, the bargaining outcome between the
incumbent states must end with a proposal for amendment that contains higher
treaty obligations than the original treaty. In our notation, the proposed treaty
content s3T is greater than the existing treaty content s2T for the two incumbent
states. (Opposite results obtain in the case where treaty participation and treaty
content are substitutes.)
When the treaty amendment s3T is proposed, state 3 needs to verify whether the
obligations imposed by the proposed treaty amendment provide an opportunity to
improve upon its status quo payoff. For a third party state without alternative
treaty opportunities, the status quo payoff coincides with the opportunity cost
24

From the first order condition, dsT* dN =

and
when

*
0 , dsT dN > 0 when
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obtainable in the absence of treaty participation. State 3 must consider whether
V33 ( s3T ) Vˆ31 . If so, state 3 joins the original signatory states, and the original treaty
content is amended to s3T = s3T . On the other hand, if V33 ( s3T ) < Vˆ31 , the
proposed treaty amendment generates a payoff for state 3 lower than its
opportunity cost, and state 3 is not willing to join the treaty under those terms. In
this case, state 3 may have the opportunity to make a counter-offer to the
incumbent states, proposing different terms for the amended treaty.
Recall that the proposed treaty amendment, s3T , was the solution to the
bargaining problem between the incumbent states. However, in additional to the
specific proposed treaty content s3T , the possibility of entry by state 3 generates a
range of Pareto superior alternatives for states 1 and 2. Thus the lack of acceptance
of the proposed treaty content s3T by state 3 may still leave a range of potentially
acceptable alternative terms for the two incumbent states. That is, counter-offer by
state 3 may not be in vain. Figure 2 focuses on the choice of the newcomer state. It
illustrates cases in which the third party state finds the initially proposed terms s3T
unacceptable and makes a counter-offer, with a request for concessions from the
incumbent states. The third-party state’s rejection of the initial proposal is
inevitable when the payoff under the proposed terms V33 ( s3T ) is less than its
opportunity cost Vˆ31 . In turn the incumbent states need to entertain and evaluate
the counter-offer.
Subcase A. Third State Applies for Entry Requesting Minor Concession
In Figure 2, the graph on the left illustrates the case where the third state applies
for entry asking for a minor concession. The incumbent states’ proposed treaty
terms, s3T , call for an increase over obligations undertaken in the original treaty,

s2T . This proposed amendment is unacceptable to state 3, since it would generate
lower payoffs for this state than those obtainable without treaty participation. To
generate a positive return from joining the treaty, state 3 should propose an
alternative treaty content less than s3T . In fact, any treaty content less than s3T
and greater than s2T benefits the acceding state as well as all incumbent states. We
use s3T as the proxy for this mutually beneficial treaty modification, and abstract
from further bargaining problems between acceding and incumbent states. The
counter-offer s3T provides treaty obligations above those of the original treaty,
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s2T , but lower than those of the initial proposed amendment. Since states 1 and 2
prefer a higher level of treaty content given more participants, they find this minor
request for concession acceptable and allow entry by state 3. In this case, a 3-state
treaty is formed with treaty obligations set at s3T = s3T .

Subcase B. Third State Applies for Entry Requesting Major Concession
The graph on the right panel of Figure 2 illustrates the situation when a more
substantial concession is requested by the third-state applicant. The initial treaty
amendment s3T proposed by the incumbent states again imposes higher
obligations than those in the original treaty ( s2T ). This proposed amendment is
unacceptable to state 3. In order to make it worth its while to participate in the
treaty, state 3 makes a counter-offer proposing lower treaty obligations s3T . This
not only constitutes a departure from the proposed treaty amendment, s3T , it also
lowers the treaty obligation below the original treaty value s2T . This counter-offer
by state 3 represents a major concession request from the incumbent states, since
they prefer raising treaty content in concert with an expansion of membership.
Whether the original signatory states are willing to make this larger concession
depends on the circumstances of the case. In the relevant range where expansion
of membership brings large positive benefits, admitting state 3 brings potential
benefits that may lead incumbent states to compromise on the treaty terms. That
is, although the incumbent states prefer to increase treaty obligations as
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1148
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membership increases, they are willing to compromise treaty content to promote
membership expansion as long as the payoffs from the treaty enlargement are
greater than the payoffs from the original treaty. That is, concessions are made by
the incumbents if V13 ( s3T ) Vˆ12 and V23 ( s3T ) Vˆ22 . When these conditions hold,
the original treaty is amended and the states form a 3-state treaty with treaty
obligations set at s3T = s3T .
On the other hand, if V13 ( s3T ) < Vˆ12 or V23 ( s3T ) < Vˆ22 , then state 1, state 2, or
both object to the proposed treaty amendment s3T . No treaty content is agreeable
to the incumbent states and the newcomer state. In this case, the application of the
third state for entry is rejected and no treaty expansion takes place.
Given multiple incumbents in an N-state treaty, similar considerations drive the
process of treaty amendment in contemplation of entry of a new party state. Two
additional observations should be made at this point. First, a state may apply for
membership to a treaty even though the applicant state is unwilling to accept the
current treaty content. This may be so because the third-party state knows that
incumbent states would benefit from membership expansion, and that its
application for accession opens the opportunity for renegotiating the existing treaty
terms. Even in a closed-treaty regime where any state may veto entry of a new
state, the net benefits of treaty expansion may be high enough to induce each
incumbent state to compromise its own position in order to promote entry of the
third state.
Second, when multiple states are interested in applying for admission, the
positions of third-party states may be strengthened if they apply as a block, rather
than sequentially. Notwithstanding the increase in bargaining power of the new
block, the gain in payoffs may make a difference. Major concessions may be
unacceptable to one or more incumbent states if proposed by a single applicant.
When multiple third-party states apply for admission as a block, the greater
magnitude of the benefit from large-scale expansion may justify a larger concession
on treaty content. This may explain the stylized fact that treaty expansions for EU
membership include several new states at each time of enlargement.

2.2.2. “Semi-Open” Treaties: Consent by Median-Voter State
For semi-open treaties, entry of a new member state requires approval by a
majority of the existing signatory states. It is assumed that the process of treaty
expansion is carried out through majority vote. Thus, an application of the Median
Voter theorem makes the impact on the welfare of the median voter state, state
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m , the focus of attention in our analysis (Downs, 1957; Black, 1958).25 Given that the
content of the treaty obligation is the critical variable, the median voter state has
median preferences with respect to the treaty content, s. In an application for entry
by a newcomer state, the median state decides whether the application is accepted,
leading to an expansion of the treaty from N to N + 1 participants. In reaching
this decision, the median state confronts the following problem:

max VmN +1 ( s) = Vm1 ( s) + ( s, N + 1) cm
s

s.t. VmN +1 VˆmN .

Similar to the previous case of a closed treaty, we assume that negotiations on
treaty content take place when states apply for accession and incumbent states
have discretion whether to grant admission. Incumbent states may use this
opportunity to modify the level of treaty obligations specified in the treaty and
newcomer states may ask for concessions. Assume that s( N +1)T is the proposed
treaty content offered to the newcomer, state N + 1 . State N + 1 compares the
payoff under the prospective treaty arrangement to the payoff obtainable without
joining the treaty. If the treaty payoff is higher than its opportunity cost, state
N + 1 accedes. A treaty with N + 1 states is formed with s( N +1)T = s( N +1)T as
the treaty content.
On the other hand, if the proposed treaty terms are unacceptable to state N + 1
it may request concessions. The outcome of the deliberations concerning the
proposed accession would reflect the preferences of the median state m ,
according to the Median Voter theorem. If the concessions requested by the
acceding state N + 1 are acceptable to state m , the application for entry is
approved and an enlarged treaty with N + 1 states is formed. Otherwise, no
expansion of the existing treaty occurs.

2.2.3. “Open” Treaties: Take It or Leave It
Treaties with open accession provide an open invitation (at times, subject to
limitations) to non-signatory states to join the original treaty signed by the founding
states. There is no need for negotiations between incumbent and newcomer states
at the time of accession. Although open accession clauses are more common in
The assumptions of the Median Voter theorem include single-picked preferences and nonalienation. In this context, single-picked preferences with respect to s imply that states prefer
treaty obligations closer to their ideal first-best point than treaty obligations that are further away.
Non-Alienation implies that all states have an interest in participating in the deliberation through
voting and that even states holding extreme preferences will not withdraw from the collective
deliberation or be alienated from the decision process.
25
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multilateral treaties promoting international cooperation between states, we
examine the simple case of two founding states. There are two aspects to the
problem. First, the founding states start negotiating to see if both states benefit
from forming a treaty, assuming that the treaty will not be open. Let the proposed
closed treaty content be the bargaining solution to (1), leading to payoffs Vˆ12 and

Vˆ22 for the two states. Next, if the founding states expect future applications for
accession to the treaty, they are confronted with another bargaining problem. They
may adjust the treaty content, leaving the treaty open to reflect their expectations
for enlargement and easing the cost of future negotiation. Let’s say that N E is the
expected number of states that will apply for accession. The founding states will
bargain to reach a level of treaty obligation that maximizes their expected gains
under the enlarged treaty. In particular, the bargaining problem with an open treaty
becomes:

(3)

max (V1N
s

E

E
Vˆ12 ) (V2N Vˆ22 )1

s.t. V1N

E

E
Vˆ12 , V2N

Vˆ22

Note that the incumbent states’ default position in this second Nash bargaining
problem is given by the best payoff under the alternative 2-state closed treaty. Only
when the prospect for treaty enlargement increases both incumbents’ expected
payoffs do the founding states leave the treaty open for accession while setting
treaty content in expectation of such enlargement. If no treaty content satisfies (3),
then the incumbent states do not support treaty expansion and consequently settle
for a closed treaty structure. This may happen in situations where the states
perceive that a bilateral or plurilateral treaty creates an advantage for the member
states, and that such an advantage will vanish if the treaty is expanded through
accession of third states.
On the other hand, if s N ET is the solution to (3), then an open treaty is formed
with treaty content specified as s N ET . The founding states’ decision to leave the
treaty open for accession allows newcomer states to join the treaty as originally
specified without the need to negotiate entry or to obtain approval from
incumbent states. Entry is granted when the acceding state agrees to be bound by
the original treaty. If the terms are not acceptable, the newcomer state can still
apply for entry, requesting that the terms of the treaty be modified. But such
modification should be carried out through treaty amendment, as if the treaty were
a closed treaty.26
26 Treaties left open for accession usually limit admissibility of reservations at the time of
accession. This pre-commitment strategy limits strategic behavior and hold-up problems by third
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3. CONCLUSION
In this paper we develop a stylized model of treaty formation and accession. We
distinguish between three modalities with which states can become party to an
international treaty according to the procedures set forth by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties: (i) Closed treaties for which treaty
membership expansion requires the unanimous approval of the existing signatory
states; (ii) Semi-open treaties where treaty expansion can be approved by a majority
of signatory states; and (iii) Open treaties that offer third states the option to
accede by expressing their intent to be bound to the existing treaty terms.
Our analysis can easily be extended to include variations such as having the mostfavored nation clause incorporated into the original treaty, under which both
signatories agree that if state 2 makes another relevant treaty with a third state, the
terms of the second treaty apply to state 1 as well. If similar treaty content for the
second treaty would also increase its payoff, state 1 would like to be guaranteed the
same extra benefit created by the new alliance between states 2 and 3. The mostfavored nation clause can also reduce the temptation to state 2, making it more
difficult for state 3 to seduce state 2 to create a new treaty that bypasses the prior
agreement made in the original treaty between states 1 and 2. These pressures
make it advantageous for the original signatory states to insist on a closed treaty
that includes a most-favored nation clause. A more stringent form of closed treaty
helps a state protect itself against future unpleasant surprises and increases its
bargaining power when a third nation attempts to steer away the cooperation effort
from one of the signatories.
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have become an important instrument to
attract foreign investment by many emerging economies. Often, investors in a
(home) country are not confident about the investment environment of a potential
host country. A potential host country believes that it would benefit from signing a
treaty, conceding to favorable investment conditions that set a stable and
advantageous framework for foreign direct investment deals in the host country. In
BITs, the signatories agree to a set of rules governing investments made by home
country investors in the jurisdiction of the host country. Our analysis can help
explain why there are a growing number of BITs, but few multilateral investment
treaties. Consistent with the predictions of our model, BITs are typically not open
to accession by other states, as they are often concluded among relatively
heterogeneous states (an advanced economy and a less-developed country). Since
the more developed nation has dominant trading and negotiating power, treaty
content favors the dominant nation. Dominant states tend to duplicate the terms
states at the time of accession. States wishing to accede to an existing open treaty have little
opportunity to renegotiate treaty terms or to request unilateral exemptions or concessions.
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of BITs, using the same treaty content with different partners in different bilateral
treaties. The advantage of using multiple BITs over a single multilateral treaty is
that the dominant state thus avoids being out-voted by the less developed
countries. Instead, it does not have to make concessions, and can maintain its
dominant power and dictate the terms of each BIT.
In practice, when states face the prospect of a multilateral international
agreement, two interrelated choices need to be made. First, states must decide
whether to be among the promoters of the international treaty, engaging in the
negotiations for its drafting and signature. Second, signatory states have to decide
whether to leave the treaty open for accession by other states and, if so, under what
conditions. This paper reveals the effect of the choice of treaty form on the
evolution of treaty content given the different expansion mechanisms set forth by
these regimes. In turn, these findings help predict when states may join the original
founding states and when they instead would prefer to wait and accede to the
treaty at a later time.
This paper further unveils an important interrelationship between the chosen
form of treaty and its substantive content. When a treaty is left open and the
accession of other states is expected, treaty content is set optimally on the basis
of incumbent states’ expectation of treaty enlargement. This may alter treaty
content from that which would be chosen either under other treaty forms or if
no expansion was expected. Open treaties simplify the expansion process, but
impose uncertainty costs on incumbent states. Founding states calibrate treaty
content on the basis of their expectation of enlargement, but such expectations
may not be fulfilled, or may be fulfilled with delay. In this context, time
preference may become a relevant factor in determining the timing of treaty
participation for given states.
Another interesting insight is the paradoxical result that closed treaties may at
times be conducive to greater expansion than open treaties. While expanding a
closed treaty through treaty amendment imposes greater transaction costs, it allows
tailored negotiations that may render the treaty acceptable to a newcomer state that
might not have been acceptable under the original terms, even if the treaty had
been left open for accession.
Further work should be carried out to collect data and test our results beyond the
anecdotal evidence offered in this paper. In order to carry out such empirical
testing in the context of multilateral treaties it would be useful to focus on specific
types of treaties where the international obligations created by the treaty are limited
to one narrow and well-defined sphere of activity (e.g., extradition, mutual
recognition of medical degrees, mutual access to territorial waters, freedom of
movement for unskilled workers). A quantitative analysis in the context of broader
treaties such as the WTO, the Treaty of Rome and subsequent European treaties,
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might be less illuminating, inasmuch as the multiple dimensions of cooperation are
confounded, making it difficult to ascertain the degree of “homogeneity” or
“heterogeneity” of the participating states. The empirical analysis of specific areas
of international law would allow the use of data to support or refute the
predictions of our model.
Subsequent work should also consider the dynamics of endogenous treaty
participation. There is an unavoidable tradeoff between treaty content and
participation. With heterogeneous states, an increase in the number of states
increases network and coordination benefits for all participating states, but
exacerbates diversity, making it harder to select treaty content that reflects each
state’s ideal. The results of this paper may provide a basis for understanding when
to expect universal multilateral treaties and when to expect formation of multiple
treaties among homogeneous states with more limited participation. Adjustments
to treaty content and participation may lead to a gradual clustering of states, with
the formation of many different treaties that optimally balance the benefits of
expansion with the costs brought about by increased heterogeneity in participation.
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